The research findings of Professor Huang He (the first author) and Professor Xu Hongyan (corresponding author) of the School of Economics and Business Administration of Chongqing University in collaboration of Chair Professor Liu Liming from Hong Kong Lingnan University, Professor Geoffrey Parker from Dartmouth College and Assistant Professor Tan Yinliang from Tulane University have been published officially in Edition 5, Volume 28 (p. 1,206 to p 1,221) of Production and Operations Management, a top international journal on economics and administration in May 2019 under the title “Multi-Attribute Procurement Auctions in the Presence of Satisfaction Risk”. Production and Operations Management is the flagship journal of Production and Operations Management, and is also a UTD journal and an FT journal. UTD journal is used to measure the top-grade research findings on management. It is reported that this was the first time that CQU teachers had published papers in a UTD journal as the first author. It reflected the level and influence of CQU teachers engaged in high-level original research in management, and contributed considerably to the “Double-First-Rate” construction of Chongqing University.
Topic of the paper: The auction mechanism design with uncertain service quality taken into consideration is an important theoretical and practical topic. In this paper, the multi-factor auction mechanism design with customer satisfaction risk and supplier ethical risk taken into consideration. The following main conclusions and scientific findings have been obtained through model analysis: Firstly, it has been proved that the supplier uncertainty pseudonym type optimization problems could be separated: The quality bidding should be optimized together with the effort level, and the price bidding should be optimized based on the uncertainty pseudonym type. Secondly, the equilibrium strategy between supplier quality and price bidding and the optimal effort level have been obtained and the optimal auction mechanism has been designed. It was discovered that the effort level and quality bidding were mutually supplementary or replaceable. Thirdly, as the mechanism optimization goal changed from allocative efficiency to revenue maximization, the supplier quality bidding would distort downwards, and the effort level would see bi-directional change: When they were mutually supplementary, it distorted downwards; when they were mutually replaceable, it distorted upwards. Fourthly, the minimum score should be limited for optimal auction mechanism; or the upper price limit and lower quality limit should be set equivalently at the same time. Optimal mechanism design is impossible if only price or quality is limited. Fifthly, it was discovered that the random effects of different forms would result in essential change of bidding behavior and mechanism design. In particular, in the addition and random circumstances, the increase of randomness would result in Pareto improvement.